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"The judiciary," said Hamilton in the 78th Federalist, "has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of
the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever."'
It did not turn out quite the way Hamilton imagined. The Court
has proved itself capable of taking a few active resolutions. Never
for long has it been that remote, unintrusive, seldom noticed insti-
tution envisioned in the 78th Federalist. But while the Court has
been much in the minds of its countrymen, and not always favor-
ably, while it has seemed to many Americans to be a deviant, an
inconsistent institution in a political democracy, and also otherwise
an irritant-just the same, while we have talked about it endlessly,
we have never known what, if anything, to do about it. We have,
indeed, seldom wished to do anything about it, coming to the brink
only once or twice, notably in the Court-packing fight of 1937. Like
Easterners transplanted to southern California, who find themselves
missing the four seasons, rain, snow, sleet and all, our people would
no doubt discover that they missed the Court if they ever did figure
out something to do about it. It may be, as Felix Frankfurter once
remarked, at a time when he was being highly critical of the Court
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of the 1920's and 30's, that if the Supreme Court "did not exist, we
should have to create it.
' :2
The nature of the Court's impact on the society, the process that
produces the impact, and the justification for it-all are ill-under-
stood by all concerned-lay observers and professional, indeed at
times by the Court itself.
In one aspect, the Court does play a clear, readily recognizable
role. This is a symbolic role, important in itself, and essential to the
performance of any other function. It is this role that for many
observers was put in question by the affair that resulted in the
resignation of Justice Fortas, and by the charges of ethically dubi-
ous behavior that were leveled against Judge Clement Haynsworth,
and that caused his nomination to fail. Again, this role of the Court
was put in question also by the rather well-substantiated-as I
thought them-accusations of racism that were made against ex-
Judge (and in a way, ex-Senator) Harrold Carswell, and that de-
feated his nomination, in turn. A story Chief Justice Taft used to
enjoy telling illustrates the symbolic role I have in mind.
For many decades, until it moved into its present quarters in
1935, the Court sat in a beautiful room in the Capitol, where Sen-
ators throw luncheon parties these days. The room is still known as
the Supreme Court Room, but its uses, one may think, have degen-
erated. It is on the east side of the main corridor of the Capitol, and
there used to be a robing room on the west side. Sessions of court
would start at noon sharp-they don't any longer; another tradi-
tion broken!-and just before noon, attendants would come out,
separate the ever-present crowd of tourists, and rope off a passage-
way across the corridor, through which the robed Justices then
marched in a line to the courtroom, the Chief Justice at their head.
Taft would tell of the bystander who was overheard to remark, in
utmost seriousness and sheer awe: "Christ, what dignity !"
Before it is anything else, before, indeed, it can even try to be
anything else, the Court is and must be the symbol of dignified de-
tachment, of a disinterestedness remote from the everyday hurly-
burly of the political, or any other, market place.
But the Court is, of course, also an instrument of policy, a
branch of government. It is in this latter role-made possible by
the first, and in tension with it-that the Court is mysterious, ill-
understood.
We speak easily of a Warren Court and a Burger Court, and
2 Frankdurter, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court, in Law and Politics
52 (E. Prichard, Jr. & A. MacLeish.eds. 1962).
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thus indulge what the late Thomas Reed Powell called an unwar-
ranted animism. At least, such terms mislead in that they suggest
sharp breaks, which do often occur when other institutions of
government change hands. But sharp breaks occur very rarely in-
deed, if ever-the very special circumstances of the period 1937 to
1941 may be the exception that proves the rule-very rarely, if
ever, in the Supreme Court. The reasons are at least two. First,
personnel changes are very slow. Second, the institution has a
life-force of its own that can exert dominion over, and bend the
preconceptions of, the strongest of new men.
Yet there are eras in the history of the Supreme Court, and
such an era very probably ended with the departure of Chief Jus-
tice Warren. What is to come next is a function of new men-two
already-and of events.
We know something about the kind of new men we will get. The
President has said that he intends to put some "strict construction-
ists" on the Court. The variety of often contradictory meanings
poured into that phrase over the course of our constitutional history
is of no moment. What the President means by it is plain enough; it
is one thing that he has, in the phrase he is so fond of using, made
very clear. He intends to pick men who, he hopes, will be-liter-
ally-conservative in the use of judicial power; who will, by and
large, let the society be, and leave the initiative for reform and
change to the President, to Congress, and to state and local govern-
mental bodies. Like some, though of course by no means all, profes-
sional observers of the Court, the President would like to see a less
intrusive Court than we have experienced in recent years.
Nevertheless, of the two elements of change, men and events, the
new men, the new "strict constructionists" whom Mr. Nixon will
perhaps have the opportunity to give us, may be harder to predict
than the events. No doubt, forward reforming movement will be
slowed, particularly in the area of criminal procedure, and there
will be changes of tone, nuance, perhaps of emphasis, throughout.
The Court Mr. Nixon will have reconstructed will very likely con-
solidate, modify, and moderate some of the reforms of the past
decade and a half. But only the most daring would venture to guess
just exactly what the new men will do with these old problems.
Events, paradoxically enough, may be somewhat easier to fore-
tell. They are quite likely to alter the nature of at least two major
categories of problems the Court has dealt with, and, albeit cau-
tiously and ever fallibly, one may venture perhaps to predict that
new circumstances will exact new responses from the Justices.
I would like to direct attention, in some detail, to developments
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in the public schools, with which the Court has been continuously
concerned, of course, since Brown v. Board of Education,8 the
school desegregation decision; and more briefly, to the problem of
apportionment, the one man, one vote problem.
Some familiar but often misunderstood history may show us
where we are in the constitutional law of public schools, and how
we got here. Brown v. Board of Education dealt with legally en-
forced segregation, and declared it unconstitutional. I am not now
talking about various strands in the philosophy that underlay the
decision in Brown, or about inferences that may be drawn from the
opinion. I am talking about the factual situation that was before
the Justices, and I am stating what I understand them to have
decided. Most lower appellate courts have understood the Brown
case as I do, and none has explicitly read it otherwise.
In administering the disestablishment of legally segregated,
dual school systems against strong resistance over the years, the
lower federal courts, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare acting under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 and
the Supreme Court itself have laid down a number of rules, which
may be thought of as rules of administration, or of implementation.
Thus the Supreme Court made it clear that freedom-of-choice plans
superimposed on an essentially dual system, and producing no more
than a minor black presence in previously all-white schools, will not
do. Nor will residential zoning, to the extent that it uses schools
originally located so as to implement a policy of segregation, partic-
ularly if they are substandard schools; or if pupils are allowed to
transfer out of schools into which they have been zoned, but in
which they are in a racial minority; or if a school board otherwise
fails to satisfy a judge or the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare of its good faith. Finally, faculties and all other activ-
ities must be desegregated.
These rules of administration were essential to the maintenance
of the integrity and credibility of law. They required the manifesta-
tion in practice of the principle of Brown v. Board of Education,
which in turn was crucial to a believable-meaning an honest and
effective-legal order. We would have mocked the principle of
Brown if we had allowed the South to wipe some laws formally off
its books, and then to continue with segregation as usual, through
inertia, custom, and the application of private force. And so we
have quite properly, indeed necessarily, implemented Brown by de-
manding the palpable, visible disestablishment of the prior system
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
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of legally enforced segregation, and the substitution for it, in a
phrase-but it is only a phrase-of a unitary system.
Some lower federal courts, and in some instances the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, have gone farther. They
have taken literally Justice Brennan's dictum in the Green case of
19685 that there should be no white schools or Negro schools, "but
just schools,"8 and have directed the achievement of a racial balance
in each school of a system, corresponding more or less to the pro-
portion of the black to the white race in the system's total school
population. But such racial-balance decisions are conditioned by the
particular circumstances and the history of litigation of particular
school districts. The Supreme Court itself, as Chief Justice Burger
pointed out in his brief concurrence in the Memphis case,7 in which
the Court denied certiorari last March, has not decided whether
"any particular racial balance must be achieved in the schools.",,
Nor, as the Chief Justice went on to say, has the Court told us "to
what extent school districts and zones may or must be altered as a
constitutional matter; to what extent transportation may or must
be provided to achieve the ends sought by prior holdings of the
Court."" And the Chief Justice added: "Other related issues may
emerge."
1 0
Underlying all these questions is the fundamental one whether
"the ends sought by prior holdings of the Court,"'" the ends sought
by the constitution, remain the disestablishment, root and branch,
palpably and visibly, of prior systems of legally enforced segre-
gation, or whether the end we must now seek is the dispersal of
pupils of different races throughout each school system, and the
achievement of a racial balance in each school? That is the open
question. That is the turning point we have now reached.
I don't mean to suggest that this is the only problem that's left
and that needs attention, or that the Supreme Court will solve it for
us this winter or spring. Disestablishment is not complete. And
where complete, it remains to be policed, even as the covert enforce-
ment of racial separation in some Northern and Western school
districts remains to be policed. But the overriding question has now
become that of the ends to be sought, in the South and throughout
the country-not for the millennium, to be sure, but in the foresee-
able future.
5 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
0 Id. at 442.
7 Northross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 236 (1970).
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The question does not arise abstractly, and it can't be solved
under laboratory conditions. If our policy is to be racial dispersal
and the achievement of racial balance in the public schools, it will
have to be enforced under social and economic conditions prevail-
ing in the United States today, and within the established legal
order in the United States today. Moreover, for the Supreme Court,
as indeed for Congress or the President, the question is posed as
one of national policy. It is thus a different question than may be
presented in communities across the country, which may adopt a
policy of their own without needing to worry about its applicability
elsewhere, in variable circumstances. One may decide against racial
dispersal as a national policy, and yet hope devoutly that it will
take place in many communities, and work hard toward that end.
But one must take very serious pause before settling on a national
policy that one intends to apply and enforce in some communities,
but not necessarily in other ones.
I think I appreciate the idealism that moves proponents of a
policy of racial balance. And I think I appreciate the force of argu-
ments made in support of such a policy, although I do not find them
ultimately persuasive.
The distinction, which in the main the cases have so far drawn,
between legally enforced segregation (de jure), which must be dis-
established, and separation without legal compulsion (de facto),
which is allowed to persist-this distinction strikes many people as
thin, legalistic, not altogether ingenuous. But such distinctions are
entirely characteristic of our law, indeed of any legal system. They
are far more prevalent than rules, as Justice Holmes once said, of
"simple universality." "I do not think we need trouble ourselves,"
Justice Holmes wrote, in a different context, of course, "with the
thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The
whole law does so as soon as it is civilized."'1
The law in most of its concerns finds stopping points, at which
effective returns diminish, or at which one value clashes with an-
other. That is when it draws lines and emphasizes differences of
degree, which may seem arbitrary or appear disingenuous if seen
in isolation at the point of contact, but which are ineluctable, as
much a necessary part of a legal order as the great principles at
whose peripheries they occur.
De facto separation of the races in the schools generally re-
flects, through a neighborhood school policy, residential separation.
The arguments are made, first, that the residential separation is
12 LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P.R.R., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914)
(concurring opinion).
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itself a function of law, and, second, that even if it isn't, to reflect
it in a compulsory school assignment policy is to enforce segrega-
tion by law at one remove.
Quite possibly, as Professor Edward C. Banfield has pointed out
in his recent book, The Unheavenly City,13 we overestimate the
degree to which legal coercion or inducement, and indeed private
racial prejudice, have been decisive factors in producing residential
separation. There is prejudice, of course, and the law has catered
to it. But the composition of urban neighborhoods may be a con-
sequence, more importantly, of relatively impersonal social and
economic forces that operate in the growth and development of
metropolitan areas. In any event, if residential separation is forced
or induced in significant measure by law, then it is the root problem
to which the law should address itself. It would follow that resi-
dential separation should be declared unconstitutional or otherwise
unlawful.
An occasional lower federal court has tackled residential separa-
tion, but are we prepared to adopt forced residential racial dis-
persal as a national policy? I suggest that we are not-not only, and
not even chiefly, because of the material and social costs that would
be involved, but because we are far from sure upon reflection that
it would be the right policy. In 1968, Senator Robert Kennedy
urged a Senate subcommittee to invest by far the major portion of
federal funds for low-cost housing in the slums themselves, thus
accepting continued racial separation for the time being, rather
than outside the slums, in an effort to create integrated housing.
Senator Kennedy said:
To seek a rebuilding of our urban slums is not to turn
our backs on the goal of integration. It is only to say that
open occupancy laws alone will not suffice and that sensi-
tivity must be shown to the aspirations of Negroes and other
non-whites who would build their own communities and
occupy decent housing in neighborhoods where they now
live. And, in the long run, this willingness to come to grips
with blight of our center city will lead us toward an open
society. For it is comparability of housing and full employ-
ment that are the keys to free movement and to the estab-
lishment of a society in which each man has a real opportu-
nity to choose whom he will call neighbor.14
Others have come to similar conclusions. Piven and Cloward have
written:
13 E. Banfield, The Unheavenly City 79 (1970).
'4 Hearings on S. 8029 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs
of the Senate Banking and Currency Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), quoted
in Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 79 Yale L.. 712, 718 (1970).
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The Achilles heel of housing programs has been precisely
our insistence that better housing for the black poor be
achieved by residential desegregation. This ideal glosses over
the importance of the ethnic community as a staging area
for groups to build the communal solidarity and power neces-
sary to compel eventual access to the mainstream of urban
life.15
I shall point out further on that considerations very much like
these are relevant to the public schools. But even if they are not,
yet if we conclude that residential separation is permissible, then
why may the schools not reflect it, as they reflect socioeconomic,
ethnic and other living patterns? The answer that is made con-
stitutes perhaps the single most important argument for racial
dispersal in the schools. It is that separation of the races in the
schools works a particular and a terrible injury to black children.
It results in an unequal education for them. This proposition,
adopted in perhaps a somewhat different sense by the Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education, in the context of legally en-
forced segregation, is extended to de facto separation on the basis
of the Coleman Report."0
Now, the Coleman Report compared the education actually
given in this country several years ago to black children and white,
middle-class and lower-class children, in integrated and in separated
situations. Dr. Coleman and his colleagues sought to ascertain what
made a difference, and their Report is a triumph of social science,
no doubt. But the Report assessed, it could assess, of course, only
those differentiating factors which were then in being. It did not
compare what we might do with what we have been doing. It com-
pared only the things we have been doing, with each other, in the
places we have been doing them.
The Coleman Report found that the socioeconomic composition
of the classroom made a difference to the quality of education. It
found also that the racial composition of the classroom made some
smaller, less easily discernible difference. But there has been a
question ever since whether the racial factor was properly isolated,
or whether the figures purporting to deal with race simply repeated
the findings on the effect of socioeconomic class. Assuming that
racial composition of the classroom did make a difference, hard as
it was to measure it, the conclusion to be drawn from Dr. Cole-
man's data would then be that if a minority of black children, in a
15 Piven & Cloward, Desegregated Housing: Who Pays for the Reformers'
Ideal?, in Race and Poverty 175, 181-82 (J. Kain ed. 1969), quoted in Note,
Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
79 Yale L.J. 712, 718 n.17 (1970).
16 J. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966).
EVol. XLV
HeinOnline  -- 45 Tul. L. Rev. 236 1970-1971
THE NEW SUPREME COURT
percentage that had best not exceed thirty or so, are put in the
same learning situation with a majority of whites, their learning
improves.
It would follow that as the percentage of blacks rises toward a
majority, nobody's learning improves, and ultimately there is a loss
for some-that is, a loss in terms of what the middle-class parent
wants the school to give his child. Moreover, Dr. Coleman did not
find that other factors, such as per pupil expenditures, made no
difference at all to the education of deprived children, particularly
in the South, or that teacher quality made no difference at all. He
found merely that a child's socioeconomic background, and that of
his classmates, made the greater difference. And he found that among
negative factors deriving from family background that the school,
if possible, must counteract, the one that seemed to relate most
strongly to achievement was the child's lack of a sense of control of
the environment.
Slender and not really conclusive as the findings of the Coleman
Report may be, one could understand basing a policy of racial
balance on them, even a rather major policy, involving large expen-
ditures, not only of material resources, but of political and other
energies, if there were nothing else in play, if there were no com-
peting values also legitimately entitled to consideration, and if, as a
practical matter, probable results promised adequately to reward
the effort.
Well, as to probable results, it is apparent that whites, and
particularly the middle class, among whom the dispersal of other
groups would be required to take place under a policy of racial
balance aimed at achieving the full benefits indicated in the Cole-
man Report-whites and particularly the middle class tend to leave
schools, or if not schools, classrooms, in which their children do not
form the dominant majority. This is the phenomenon of resegrega-
tion, which has been evident throughout the country, particularly
in urban areas.
It is all too facile, and not a little self-righteous, to ascribe
resegregation purely to racism. After all, there is reason to believe
that when the middle class becomes a minority in a classroom, the
educational process, as conceived from its point of view, suffers.
Whatever the motives behind it, however, resegregation is not an
instance of unlawful resistance to the law of the land, or of resis-
tance that could readily be made unlawful. Taking refuge in thinly
disguised so-called private schools, which are in truth publicly sup-
ported, has been declared unlawful. But the right as such to with-
draw from the public schools and attend a parochial or other
19711
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genuine private school is itself constitutionally protected.1 7 And the
right to change residence is surely unquestionable.
Let us be clear. Resegregation need not occur everywhere. If the
numbers are right and other conditions are favorable, stable situa-
tions of racial balance can be brought about, and we may assume
that they are beneficial. The difficulty comes in medium and large
cities. Even there, the possibility of some success is enhanced if we
are willing to enlarge the geographic area over which the attempt
to achieve racial balance is made. The middle class can be pursued.
But not into private schools, unless we quite alter their position in
the legal order; and otherwise also at high cost, by no means only
in financial terms. If the costs and the problematic prospects of
success deter us from enforcing racial balance in most medium and
large cities, does it not have to follow that where stable situations
of racial balance are achievable at moderate cost, they must be
achieved locally, as a matter of local option? For any effort to
achieve racial balance by compulsion of national law would result
in unequal application of that law, and that is not an easily justified
or sustained state of affairs.
Still, despite the relatively inconclusive body of evidence on
which we would be proceeding, and despite what is surely, at the
least, the undesirability of enforcing national law unequally, we
might be tempted to push on if there were not yet other values on
which the effort would impinge. Whites are not alone, it turns out,
in often rejecting schools in which they are not the dominant ma-
jority. Recognizing, as other groups have before them, that their
needs and aspirations may for the time being be particular to them-
selves, resenting as invidious the theory that they necessarily
benefit educationally from being in a white-majority school, and
wishing to try on for size the privilege of controlling their own
schools which other groups have exercised in our society, a growing
number of blacks resist being sent to schools in which they will
form a minority, and which they do not control. They insist that
only schools which they control can breed in their children that
sense of control of environment which Dr. Coleman found to be so
important, and they suggest that they may be able to try things the
effectiveness of which Dr. Coleman did not measure, because no-
body had tried them.18
The point then is that racial dispersal in the public schools in
present conditions in the United States cannot be regarded as
simply a desirable goal not seriously in competition with other
17 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18 See, e.g., Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimaoy, 38
Harv. Educ. Rev. 669 (1968).
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legitimate goals, or with other values embodied in our legal order.
The costs of the disestablishment of legally enforced segregation,
properly speaking, were measured entirely in money, convenience,
and offense to the prejudices of people who insisted on treating
other people invidiously. That is not the case with racial dispersal.
It competes with other legitimate values and goals-educational
quality, as the middle class perceives it, when certain percentages
are reached; the right to move or to use private schools, which can
defeat the attempt to achieve racial balance; the desire of blacks
as a group to define educational quality in their own terms, for
their own purposes; the preferences of blacks and whites for
schools close to the community, as compared with distant ones,
which necessitate lengthy transportation, and are inevitably too
remote for the effective exercise of parental influence. The question
is whether under these circumstances the objective of racial dis-
persal ought to have the highest priority in the allocation of our
human, political, and material resources in the field of primary
education.
A very near analogy may be found in the field of higher edu-
cation. Brown v. Board of Education is of course applicable, has
indeed been applicable all along without the qualification of the
deliberate-speed formula. Yet its implementation has not progressed
beyond a requirement of freedom of choice. That may quite possibly
be wrong, and ought, I am inclined to think, be remedied. Some-
thing more ought to be shown by white state universities in the
South than that they no longer exclude Negroes. But one scarcely
hears proposals for the enforcement of racial balance and the con-
comitant closing of black institutions. Judge Frank Johnson of the
United States District Court in Alabama, whose credentials in
racial cases are beyond question, held just a couple of years ago,1'9
not only that no racial dispersal was required in a state's institu-
tions of higher learning, but that the scope of the affirmative duty
to disestablish prior segregation should not be "extended as far in
higher education as it has been in the elementary and secondary
public school area."20 The Supreme Court last year affirmed this
decision.21 The reason for this policy is that we perceive values-
the blacks perceive important values-in institutions which blacks
control and which meet particular needs of their community. Hence,
we are content to draw a distinction between the disestablishment
of legally enforced segregation, on the one hand, on which we in-
19 Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. School & College Auth.,
289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
20 Id. at 787.
21 Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. School & College Auth.,
393 U.S. 400 (1969). See also Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D.
Tenn. 1968).
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sist, and, on the other hand, the enforcement of racial balance,
which we do not undertake.22
We cannot, said the Court in Brown v. Board of Education in
1954, "turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson [the
separate-but-equal decision] was written. We must consider public
education in light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the nation."23 That development, we now
know, was not full and not final at the time of the Brown case, and
that place is changing. So the Burger Court may find itself unable
to turn the clock back to 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education
was written, as it deals with problems that will not answer to the
solutions of 1954.
Nor may the Burger Court be able to turn the clock back to the
early 1960's, when the one man, one vote rule was enunciated.
Passing the decade and a half of his tenure in review after he
had announced his retirement, Chief Justice Warren reflected that
the most important achievement of the Court he had headed was
the apportionment revolution. That is saying quite a bit, having
regard to all else the Warren Court did. And it is a curious
judgment.
There has been an apportionment revolution, in the sense that
virtually all state legislatures have reapportioned themselves, and
most have redistricted their state Congressional delegations. But
Chief Justice Warren could not have meant that there has also been
a consequent revolution in the nation's politics. Despite the most
preposterously sanguine expectations with which the effort to en-
gage the Federal judiciary in the apportionment of legislatures has
been invested ever since the 1940's, success has made little differ-
ence in the output of the political process, which is what was hoped
for. Malapportionment, its foes had persuaded each other, was the
source of most of our domestic ills. In it were the roots of the urban
crisis and of the obsolescence of federalism. It was the essential
reason why "wealth accumulates, and men decay." There are, it has
turned out, other roots, less easily reached; other reasons, less
easily understood. And if reapportionment has resulted in a re-
distribution of political power among various groups, the benefi-
ciaries either don't know it yet, or don't know how to use their
newly acquired power, or are not the ones who were expected to
get it.
22 See Note, The Affirmative Duty to Integrate in Higher Education, 79 Yale
L.J. 666 (1970).
23 347 U.S. at 492-93.
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In any event, even if it were true that the apportionment revo-
lution has enabled certain groups, previously out of power, to get
what they want out of the political process, that could scarcely have
been Chief Justice Warren's reference when he spoke of the Court's
most important achievement, as he saw it. The output of the politi-
cal process-who gets what-is no business of the Court, and the
Chief Justice would not have had, or avowed, any such concern.
Most assuredly, he meant rather that the Court's apportionment
decisions confirmed a fundamental principle of political organiza-
tion, which is valid regardless of the results it produces; he meant
that the Court has secured a salutary observance of the principle
of majoritarianism. That is what Chief Justice Warren was cele-
brating, for as Walter Lippmann wrote of earlier populists, the
Chief Justice "is hypnotized by the belief that the great thing is to
express the will of the people, first because expression is the highest
interest of man, and second because the will is instinctively good.",24
Actually Chief Justice Warren is quite wrong. His Court's ap-
portionment decisions have given us no new birth of majoritarian-
ism, any more than they changed the substantive course of Ameri-
can politics. But the crucial point against them is that a rigorous
majoritarianism is not what our institutions rest on, nor is it what
the country needs.
The American government-as Chief Justice Warren might
have been expected to remember; nothing is stranger than a populist
judge!-includes a Supreme Court, which wields political power,
and is not only not majoritarian, it is not elected. Our government
includes a Senate, which because its members are elected at large
in each state has often been in recent years more responsive to
liberal and reforming trends than the House, but in which each
state, regardless of population, has an equal vote that not even a
duly enacted and ratified constitutional amendment can, without
its own consent, deprive it of. Our government includes a House of
Representatives in which each state has at least one vote, even
though the whole state may be-and some are-considerably smaller
in population than the average congressional district. And aside
from the fact that very few of our institutions of government, and
none of our national ones, are out-and-out majoritarian, we don't
choose to do everything by simple majority votes.
One may view all these institutions and devices as outrageously
undemocratic, hardly less undemocratic than a malapportioned
legislature, and be prepared to sweep them all away also, including
conceivably the Supreme Court itself, the next time the majori-
24 W. Lippmann, Public Opinion 312 (1922).
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tarian broom cleans out the stables. In truth these institutions and
devices tell us that throughout our history we have perceived other
values in government than mere responsiveness to simple majorities
of the moment, which are in any event not easy to find and are as
often imaginary as real; and we have defined democracy as the
rather complex sum of these values, not just as uncompromising
majoritarianism. We have, since Madison, realized that people tend
to act politically not so much as individuals as in groups; that they
have opinions, preferences, and interests which vary in intensity,
thus calling for varying degrees of respect and forbearance on the
part of others, even if those others constitute a majority; that
majorities sometimes act rashly and even mindlessly, and may need
to be given pause; that, in short, influence and even power should
be distributed more widely than they would be in rigid adherence
to the majoritarian principle, so that government may rest on wide-
spread consent rather than teetering on the knife-edge of a momen-
tary majority. For we have wanted government to be stable and
peaceable, and to have the most limited need to resort to coercion.
What we have evolved, therefore, is not majority rule, but a
pluralist system, in Professor Robert Dahl's phrase, of minorities
rule. We have striven, perhaps it may be said, not for a majori-
tarian, but for a participatory democracy, in which access to the
process of government is continuously available to all groups. The
sensible question to ask about any multi-member institution of
government, therefore, is not whether it is purely majoritarian, but
whether it tends to enhance minorities rule; whether it tends to
include or exclude various groups from influence, and whether if it
assigns somewhat disproportionate influence to some groups, they
are the ones which are relatively short-changed elsewhere, so that
the total effect is the achievement of a balance of influence.
From the beginning, the Warren Court's apportionment deci-
sions have consistently asked the wrong questions about American
political institutions. Not unnaturally, they have, therefore, also
come up with the wrong answers. But the right questions cannot
be avoided foreover. And the wrong answers are coming under
challenge in the field of local government, again in connection with
the schools, among other institutions.
The one man, one vote rule necessarily deprives discrete group-
ings and interests, regional, racial, and other, of direct representa-
tion. It makes impossible in state and local government the applica-
tion in any degree of the method of federalism. At a time when
division among groups and interests is as marked and deeply felt
as ever; when unity is something to be striven for, to be pain-
stakingly constructed and perhaps attained, not to be taken for
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granted; when the call for functional decentralization in govern-
ment is insistent; at a time, in sum, when the participatory aspect
of our democracy needs the greatest emphasis and when, therefore,
the device of federalism should be available for the freest and most
imaginative use, the Court has virtually outlawed it.
It seems to be generally conceded that the structure of urban
government is obsolete. The cities serve many more people, groups,
and interests than, given the present limits of their jurisdiction,
they govern and can tax. Jurisdictional lines ought to be redrawn,
therefore, as occasionally they have been in the past. This is con-
ventional wisdom, but it seems nonetheless to be right. Yet if the
jurisdiction of central urban government is to be expanded, so as
to encompass outlying suburban areas, the one person, one vote rule
is going to be an insurmountable obstacle; an obstacle, in other
words, that must be removed. For metropolitan government orga-
nized on the one person, one vote principle will necessarily mean
either that the central city, increasingly black and poor, governs
the suburban middle class, whose interests are distinct and in many
respects adverse; or that the suburban middle class, combined with
its remnants in the central city, governs the black and the poor,
whose interests are distinct and in many respects adverse. Neither
result is possible politically, neither result is right. The solution
cannot be populist. It must be federal.
The federal solution is equally called for in the governance of
public schools. For a variety of reasons, there has been in recent
years a trend toward the consolidation of previously separate school
districts. When the units that are merged are pretty much alike in
resources and in ethnic, racial, and social composition of the student
body, there won't be much of a problem. Where the units are not
alike, however, their interests tend to diverge, and consolidation
under a central authority on a one person, one vote basis will be
resisted, and is not right. Enlargement of administrative jurisdic-
tion in one fashion or another offers the only possibility in metro-
politan areas of achieving any approach to racial balance in the
schools. For this and perhaps some additional purposes, it means
consolidation of units, typically of a central city school district with
its suburban neighbors. The interests of urban and suburban dis-
tricts do not altogether coincide. Such districts differ in the nature
of student populations and in resources; that is the whole point of
the drive to integrate them. The federal method of consolidation is
the fairest and most efficient, and may be the only possible one.
There is a counter-trend in the governance of public schools,
toward decentralization. The aim is to permit cohesive communities
to control their own schools through locally elected boards. Schools
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may appropriately be viewed as in large measure extensions of
coherent groups of families, but the education by any group of its
children nevertheless has externalities which affect larger com-
munities. The retention of some supervisory authority in a central
board of education will, therefore, not likely be avoided. But if the
central board is constituted on a one person, one vote basis and
elected at large, or if it must be elected from equal districts that are
not coterminous with the local school communities (which are in
turn very probably not going to be of equal size), then the author-
ity of the central board may negate a good part of what decen-
tralization seeks to attain. Hence the federal solution is again ap-
propriate.
These problems, which arise at the local government level, are
not to be taken as proving merely that the one person, one vote rule
should not have been extended to local government. Rather they
are, at the moment, the most salient illustrations of the inanities
and deficiencies of the rule.
The most valuable function that the Supreme Court performs in
our society is to draw attention to major issues, to put them force-
fully on the agenda. The Brown ease performed that function, and
so did the earliest of the reapportionment cases. But having high-
lighted a major issue, the Court often attempts to make the society
live up to its own resolution of it. That is something else again. It
seldom works over the long run, as the ramifications of the issue
become apparent.
Professor Paul Freund, the wittiest and most elegant of pro-
fessional observers of the Court, and one of my predecessors in this
lectureship, has likened some manifestations of the judicial process
to the boy who said that he knew how to spell the word banana; he
just didn't know when to stop. The inability to find the stopping
place was characteristic of the Warren Court, perhaps it is always
characteristic of the institution. But events have a way of indi-
cating stopping points, and the Burger Court may perforce allow
free play to the political process on the problems that I have dis-
cussed. Yet ultimately the Supreme Court may again seize the
initiative on yet other problems. The cycle has most often resumed
in the past, and perhaps it always shall. The word banana, anyway,
is likely always to be spelled in the same tricky, seductive fashion.
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